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Designing for Cost Transparency in Investment
Advisory Service Encounters
Clients of investment advisory services are generally dissatisﬁed because of the services’
lack of transparency. In general, advisors do not provide clients with transparent and
detailed information on costs. Such information, however, is of much importance, since an
investment portfolio’s costs directly inﬂuence its effective return. In this paper, we present a
design science research cycle on how cost transparency may be provided in client-advisor
encounters as a feature of collaborative tabletop artifacts. We ﬁnd that our cost transparent
design positively inﬂuences the client’s perception of the service encounter as well as its
results. Not only are clients more satisﬁed but also do they declare increased willingness to
pay for the cost-transparent service.
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1 Introduction
Investors are dissatisfied with their fi-
nancial service providers’ (FSPs) invest-
ment advisory services (Mogicato et al.
2009). Indeed, to counteract cost pres-
sures resulting from fierce competition,
FSPs have been optimizing their advi-
sory activities towards product sale rather
than provision of advice, leading to a
poor quality of advice (Jungermann and
Belting 2004). For investment advisory
services, research suggests several charac-
teristics that are detrimental to advisory
quality, including information asymme-
try and interest asymmetry (Oehler and
Kohlert 2009). Due to these asymme-
tries, the advisor might exploit the client’s
less knowledge and experience to oppor-
tunistically pursue his own goals (e.g., by
only superficially gathering information
or deliberately presenting information in
an incomprehensible way). Such (possi-
ble) behavior is fostered by the lack of
information disclosure, especially regard-
ing the exact costs of the investment ad-
visory service and the products offered
therein. Hence, the client cannot be sure
whether the advisor is optimizing the so-
lution for the client’s best interest or,
on the contrary, towards higher fees and
provisions.
Considering the clients’ general pref-
erence and demand for transparency
(Lechner et al. 2009), the revenue mod-
els of FSPs lead to a paradoxical situation.
FSPs are trying to confront competition
by designing cost structures to be highly
non-transparent and thereby difficult to
compare (Carlin 2009). At the same time
they are impairing the resulting service
quality as perceived by their clients – po-
tentially also affecting their satisfaction.
Indeed, looking at the prevailing business
models of Swiss FSPs and the resulting in-
centive systems of advisors, we argue that
the lack of cost transparency may be a
major source of client dissatisfaction.
As legislative regulations trying to es-
tablish transparency “top down” do not
hold up to their promises (Oehler and
Kohlert 2009), in this paper we suggest
a “bottom up” approach of introducing
transparency at the locus of investment
advisory services – the client-advisor en-
counter. We start our investigations by
posing the question of why FSPs are still
refraining from establishing cost trans-
parency. Based on a comprehensive study
of the status quo of investment advisory
services in Swiss FSPs (Mogicato et al.
2009), we find two major reasons:
(1) Given that information technology
(IT) is hardly used in advisory en-
counters (Schwabe and Nussbaumer
2009), cost transparency of advisory
results (i.e., product portfolios con-
figured by the advisor and adapted
to the client’s preferences) is very dif-
ficult to maintain. As it is complex
enough to allow for ad-hoc changes
of product allocation (e.g., replac-
ing one product with another), it
is virtually impossible to adapt and
configure such portfolios while dy-
namically adjusting or accounting
for changes in the cost structure.
The calculation of actual costs in
such scenarios is likely to be too
complex. Thereby, the client is con-
fronted with the actual costs of her
decisions typically only after they
have been made.
(2) FSPs consider cost transparency be-
ing detrimental their business mod-
els, supposing – and thereby fol-
lowing neoclassical theory’s intuition
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– that clients would always opt for
the least expensive product from a
set of (perfect) substitutes (including
products of competitors). The ma-
jority of FSPs find such client behav-
ior problematic, as they – in order to
provide their advisory services “free-
of-charge” – cross-subsidize them
with earnings from selling products.
These, in turn, involve a multitude
of subsidiary costs, such as manage-
ment fees, transaction fees, etc. This
constellation, however, exposes the
client to serious conflicts of interests.
Will the advisor optimize the client’s
portfolio according to her needs and
preferences or rather to achieve cost
coverage?
In previous research, we have suggested
that transparency issues in investment
advisory encounters may be best ad-
dressed with shared IT artifacts (Nuss-
baumer and Schwabe 2010). Providing
shared information spaces, such artifacts
may increase the client’s perceived trans-
parency in respect of the advisory process
as well as the information used therein
(Nussbaumer et al. 2012).
In this paper, we present a complete
build-and-evaluate design cycle (Hevner
et al. 2004), in which we demonstrate that
such shared artifacts may also bridge the
complexity of enabling cost transparency,
i.e., provide access to dynamic cost in-
formation. Such procedure is also inter-
esting from a transparency research per-
spective. While much literature is con-
cerned with the theoretical benefits and
effects of transparency, empirical inves-
tigations are rare, especially in terms of
design research. We aim to contribute to
this body of knowledge in two ways. First,
we provide insights into the feasibility of
incorporating facets of cost transparency
into the design of shared IT artifacts.
Second, in an experimental evaluation
we demonstrate the efficacy of such ar-
tifacts in improving cost transparency
and investigate their practical impacts on
client-advisor encounters. Based on the
literature, we thereby argue that intro-
ducing cost-transparent artifacts may –
in contrast to the FSPs’ beliefs – not only
have positive influence on the client’s sat-
isfaction with the encounter but also on
her willingness to pay.
We based the build activities of our
design science endeavor on design prin-
ciples of establishing process and in-
formation transparency in investment
advisory encounters (Nussbaumer and
Matter 2011; Nussbaumer et al. 2012).
Conceptualizing cost transparency as a
facet of information transparency, we ex-
tended these design principles by features
of cost information provision and instan-
tiated them in a shared IT artifact to
mediate client-advisor interaction.
The resulting IT artifact was evaluated
against its design goal of improving cost
transparency as well as its proposed ef-
fects of increasing client satisfaction and
willingness to pay. In order to delimit the
efficacy of cost transparency from prin-
ciples of establishing process and infor-
mation transparency, we conducted con-
trolled experiments involving two differ-
ent artifacts. The first one implemented
the general principles of process and in-
formation transparency, the other ex-
tended these principles by features of cost
transparency. Using a within-subject de-
sign with 12 clients and 2 advisors, the
experiment let client participants pass
through two advisory settings supported
with the respective artifacts. According
to the experimental design, differences
in client valuation between the settings
could be ascribed to the differences of the
IT artifacts, which were only related to
cost transparency.
Results demonstrate the cost trans-
parency design’s efficacy in improving
the client’s perceived understanding and
comprehension of costs. They also indi-
cate a positive influence of the cost trans-
parency features on the client’s general
assessment of the advisory encounter. On
the one hand, clients show increased sat-
isfaction with the cost-transparent en-
counter. On the other hand, and support-
ing Carter and Curry’s (2010) notion of
an individual’s economic and social per-
spective on product pricing, in such en-
counters clients indeed tend to prefer less
expensive products (economic perspec-
tive) but in turn exhibit increased will-
ingness to pay for the service received
(social perspective). These findings may
challenge the common belief of FSPs that
transparent, fee-based advisory services
would neither be accepted by clients nor
be economically viable.
2 Transparency in Investment
Advisory Encounters
In this paper, we investigate cost trans-
parency in Swiss investment advisory ser-
vices with a focus on affluent private
clients (with an approximate investment
amount of 50000 to 500000 CHF). We
chose to investigate this segment as it
marks the bottom end of the private
banking market and is, given its poten-
tial growth, increasingly considered a lu-
crative market by FSPs (Molyneux and
Omarini 2005). Also, most Swiss FSPs
have established structured advisory pro-
cesses to target this growing segment with
consistent and efficient services. These
services provide assistance in defining
strategic asset allocations according to
the client’s needs and risk preference as
well as their tactical implementation with
financial products. We base our practical
insights on investigations of 37 Swiss fi-
nancial service providers (Mogicato et al.
2009) as well as in-depth interviews and
observations in a major Swiss bank.
2.1 Transparency Issues
In investment advisory service encoun-
ters, client-advisor interactions exhibit
several characteristics that are detrimen-
tal to advisory quality. Most promi-
nently, the encounter is inherently im-
pacted by information asymmetry and
interest asymmetry, problems that are
well established in scientific literature in
context of the principal-agent problem
(Golec 1992). Information asymmetry
results from the client being generally less
knowledgeable than the advisor. Hence,
she cannot be sure whether the advisor
actually gathers and provides all relevant
information and recommends appropri-
ate solutions for her financial needs. The
relation between client and advisor can
be additionally strained by conflicts of
interests. Advisors might exploit infor-
mation asymmetry by, e.g., superficially
gathering and providing information or,
even worse, recommending products that
are unsuitable for the specific client’s
needs but profitable in terms of fees.
From the client’s perspective, these is-
sues may be characterized by the implied
lack of transparency. For investment ad-
visory service encounters, we may differ-
entiate between process transparency, in-
formation transparency and cost trans-
parency. Process transparency relates to
“the degree of the client being able to fol-
low and comprehend the performed ac-
tivities (what constitutes an activity and
why is it performed) and their succes-
sion in advisory [services]” (Nussbaumer
and Matter 2011, p. 280). While this en-
tails the comprehensibility of the advi-
sory process, information transparency
involves two aspects: (1) the clients’ com-
prehension of which information are
recorded and for what purpose (Awad
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and Krishnan 2006), as well as (2) the de-
gree of the client being enabled to mon-
itor and comprehend the informational
basis of decision-making (Nussbaumer
et al. 2012).
Regarding the recommendation of
products (the ultimate goal of invest-
ment advisory services), we argue that
cost transparency is particularly rele-
vant. When buying or selling financial
products, the transaction costs as well as
the costs associated to a specific prod-
uct (including direct costs such as initial
buy charges, sell charges, stamp duties
and management fees as well as indi-
rect costs like retrocessions or finder’s
fees) play a vital role as they directly in-
fluence the portfolio’s effective return.
Providing the client with exact prod-
uct costs rather than only with their
exchange rates should thus allow for
a more realistic assessment of product
choices and their effects, thereby bet-
ter enabling the clients to evaluate the
advisor’s recommendations.
In this paper, we conceptualize cost
transparency as a facet of the discussed
second aspect of information trans-
parency, related to the client being en-
abled to monitor and comprehend the
information base of the advisory en-
counter. This concept is closely related
to price transparency, which is concerned
with “information revealing the alloca-
tion among agents in a supply-chain
of proceeds from the sale of a prod-
uct or service” (Carter and Curry 2010,
p. 760). Also acknowledging the trans-
parency definition of Kraft (2008), we
therefore may define cost transparency as
the client’s perceived degree of informa-
tion revelation regarding costs and their
allocation.
In investment advisory encounters, the
degree of information revelation is typ-
ically low or inappropriate (Oehler and
Kohlert 2009). Precise costs and prices
are either not available in the encounter
or not disclosed (e.g., because of inter-
est conflicts), or may be represented in
an overly complex manner (inherent to
the complex cost structures, e.g., Car-
lin (2009)). Thus, to establish cost in-
formation transparency, cost informa-
tion (1) has to be made available in
the advisory encounter and (2) be com-
prehensibly represented and included in
decision-making.
2.2 Eﬀects of Transparency
Looking at the diversity of research do-
mains that are concerned with trans-
parency, we find a rich body of lit-
erature on theoretical benefits and ef-
fects of transparency. Empirical investi-
gations, however, are rare, especially re-
garding advisory settings. For IS research,
we are not aware of theoretical, empiri-
cal or design-related accounts regarding
cost transparency in investment advisory
services or client-advisor encounters in
general.
For their concepts of increasing the
customer’s involvement in service en-
counters, Inbar and Tractinsky (2011)
propose that transparency may be in-
creased by sharing information with IT.
They suggest that establishing trans-
parency thereby may positively influ-
ence the client’s perception of the ser-
vice encounter and provider (e.g., regard-
ing fairness and integrity, trust and sat-
isfaction). In their empirical investiga-
tion of buyer-vendor relationships, Eg-
gert and Helm (2003) as well conclude
that transparency contributes to the over-
all success of a business relationship, de-
livers value to the customer and increases
satisfaction.
Other practical implications may be
drawn from the research of Andersson
and Holm (1998). They argue that de-
cision makers who are guided by “Pop-
perian epistemology” will have a prefer-
ence for transparency. Only if informa-
tion is provided transparently, the indi-
vidual will be able to potentially “fal-
sify” them (analogous to Popper’s notion
of falsifiability of scientific theories). An-
dersson and Holm (1998) associate such
preferences with an individual’s suspi-
cion in situations where transparency is
not warranted, and hypothesize that in-
dividuals are more inclined to suspect
manipulation when falsification of the
information at hand is more difficult.
In the behavioral finance literature,
such preference for transparency has
been prominently discussed as investors’
“ambiguity aversion” (Camerer and We-
ber 1992). Research suggests that individ-
uals appreciate “ambiguous” situations
(having no information about the proba-
bility distribution) less than “risky” situ-
ations (the probability distribution of the
event is known), and are normally will-
ing to pay to avoid ambiguity (Stracca
2004, p. 382). Carter and Curry (2010)
find similar evidence in their research on
transparent pricing, showing that indi-
viduals prefer products with transparent
prices (providing allocation of costs to
different supply-side parties) over their
non-transparent counterparts and are
willing to pay premium prices for such
products.
2.3 Cost Transparency
In Switzerland, regulations on cost dis-
closure differ depending on the relation
of client and FSP, i.e., whether the client
maintains accounts and portfolios with-
out making use of advisory services (“ex-
ecution only”), taking advice but mak-
ing her own decisions (“investment ad-
vice”) or completely transfers decision-
making to the provider (“asset manage-
ment mandate”) (Roth 2009). While in
all cases FSPs have to fulfill basic du-
ties of allegiance, due diligence and in-
formation disclosure, they are obliged to
provide detailed cost information (in-
cluding financial recompensation) only
for mandates (FINMA Eidgenössische
Finanzmarktaufsicht 2008).
For European financial markets, the
European Commission (2004) passed the
Markets in Financial Instruments Direc-
tive (MiFID) to establish uniform regu-
lations with an emphasis on consumer
protection. Generally focusing on princi-
ples of “best execution”, the directive also
demands providing all relevant cost in-
formation (European Commission 2004,
Art. 19, par. 3; Roth 2007, p. 39). Oehler
and Kohlert (2009, p. 98) argue, how-
ever, that such regulatory requirements
are too generic and thereby must fail,
as they are neither comprehensive nor
specific enough and make unrealistic as-
sumptions regarding the client’s prior
knowledge and ability to comprehend the
provided information.
The clients’ preference for transparency
and legislature’s efforts to create ade-
quate regulations on transparency, how-
ever, seems not to be mirrored in FSP’s
practice of investment advisory services
(Mogicato et al. 2009). To the contrary,
Carlin (2009) shows that complexity of
financial products tends to increase with
competition – it is, in fact, a strategy
of market participants to achieve higher
profits. As most clients are not aware of
a product’s associated costs and their in-
fluence on the portfolio’s return or not
be able to (dynamically) estimate them,
enabling transparency is timely. Finra
(2009) finds this might be a quite gen-
eral issue, reporting that the majority of
private investors (in the US) have prob-
lems with assessing costs and prices of fi-
nancial products. Thus, the responsibility
for such considerations lies with the advi-
sor, who may (or may not) exploit the in-
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formation asymmetry for his or the FSP’s
self-interest.
In a comprehensive study of advisory
practice in Swiss banks (Mogicato et al.
2009), we found that clients are quite
aware of the discussed transparency is-
sues. The prevailing lack of such trans-
parency results in clients considering fi-
nancial advisors as being rather untrust-
worthy and being not very confident
that advisors present adequate solutions
to their needs (Mogicato et al. 2009;
Nussbaumer et al. 2011). Indeed – as,
for example, Bergstresser et al. (2009)
have shown – products recommended
by advisors tend to exhibit higher costs
while featuring lower risk-adjusted re-
turn than products selected by investors
themselves.
The prevailing advisory business model
of FSPs in Switzerland (and, inciden-
tally, also in Germany and other Eu-
ropean countries (Oehler and Kohlert
2009)) builds on cross-subsidizing advi-
sory services through product and trans-
action costs (by direct and indirect costs,
as discussed above) (Roth 2007). This
strategy allows providing advisory ser-
vices “free-of-charge”. The actual costs
of advice – as included in the product
costs – remain non-transparent. Though
such lack of transparency might nega-
tively affect the client-advisor relation-
ship and the client’s resulting satisfac-
tion, FSPs are still reluctant regarding al-
ternative business models. Fee-based ad-
vice, i.e., the client being charged for
utilizing advisory services, has been dis-
cussed long-since and suggested as a solu-
tion to interest asymmetries (Oehler and
Kohlert 2009). FSPs, however, have been
countering such models by bringing for-
ward that clients were accustomed to ser-
vices provided free-of-charge and there-
fore lack willingness to pay for them. For
a “first-moving” FSP, charging fees could
thereby result in competitive disadvan-
tages (Mogicato et al. 2009).
2.4 Cost Transparency and Information
Technology
As indicated in the introduction, cost
transparency might also be inhibited by
the lack of appropriate tools. While, e.g.,
costs of individual stocks may be easily
evaluated according to up-to-date print-
outs of the according fact sheets, such
assessments tend to get more complex
for composite products such as mu-
tual funds, featuring multiple cost types.
When including the dynamic allocation
of several products while accounting and
optimizing for product and overall port-
folio costs (including means of compar-
ing different options and presenting their
effects for the client’s specific portfolio),
the use of pen and paper is clearly limited.
While the typical Swiss FSP pro-
vides the advisor with powerful tools
to prepare client encounters and per-
form follow-up activities, IT support
for advisor-client encounters is hardly
found. For Swiss advisory practice,
Schwabe and Nussbaumer (2009) found
that none of the 37 surveyed FSPs pro-
vided their advisors with dedicated tools
to be used directly with clients. The pro-
vided IT’s focus on supporting activities
outside the actual client encounter is also
reflected in standard software – most
products lack of dedicated in-meeting
support other than rotating the monitor
screen to let the client behold of visual-
izations. Such setups of ad-hoc inclusion
of IT may not only expatiate on the in-
formation asymmetry between the actors
but may also increase the inexperienced
client’s uncertainty as the visualizations
are mostly intended for experts (i.e., the
advisor) (Inbar and Tractinsky 2011).
Likewise, research on IT support of fi-
nancial advisory services (of which in-
vestment advisory services are a subset
of) often shows an implicit focus on sup-
porting the advisor in preparing client
solutions (Buhl et al. 2007; Dziarstek
et al. 2004; Eberhardt and Zimmermann
2007; Winkler 2006). The use of such sys-
tems may in fact restrict the advisor in re-
spect to opportunism (e.g., recommend-
ing products not suitable for the client
but attractive to the advisors in terms of
provisions). However, these systems are
designed to be used solely by the advi-
sor outside the encounter, i.e., before or
after the advisory session. As the client
thereby cannot actually monitor the ad-
visor’s interaction with the information
systems, they do not directly contribute
to enhanced transparency for the client,
e.g., in respect of advisory activities, the
used information and its effects. We find
this advisor-centricity to be in stark con-
trast to related domains of sales-based
advisory services such as travel consul-
tancy, where there has been some re-
search effort regarding in-situ IT support
for joint decision-making of advisor and
client (e.g., Halloran 2002; Novak and
Schwabe 2009; Rodden et al. 2003).
3 Transparent Design of
Investment Advisory Encounters
We suggest that the problem areas of
investment advisory services (low com-
prehensibility and low perceived qual-
ity because of information and interest
asymmetries) may be attributed to in-
herent transparency issues regarding the
activities of the advisory process (pro-
cess transparency), the information used
therein and their impacts (information
transparency) and, as a facet of such in-
formation, costs of the service and its
products (cost transparency). In previ-
ous design cycles, we have already de-
veloped and refined several design re-
quirements for collaborative IT support
to enable process and information trans-
parency. Thus, we will base our consid-
erations of cost transparency design on
the main principles of such IT support
(Nussbaumer et al. 2012). We will briefly
present these principles and their basic
rationales below.
The most fundamental design princi-
ple (DP) relates to information sharing
between the client and the advisor (DP1:
Provide shared information spaces for
advisor and client in order to allow in-
formation access and monitoring of ac-
tions) and represents the bottom line of
enabling IT-mediated client-advisor in-
teraction. Thereby, the client and advi-
sor should be provided shared “informa-
tional resources” that both can refer to
and make sense of Rodden et al. (2003).
As such, the client should be activated to
participate and take more responsibility
in the process, e.g., by enabling her to
(maybe autonomously) adapt or change
suggestions or recommendations of the
advisor.
To enable transparency in investment
advisory encounters, the provision of
shared information spaces is necessary
but not sufficient. To cooperate (and co-
create) with the advisor, the client has to
understand and comprehend the means
and ends, i.e., the advisor’s activities and
their goals (DP2: Enable client compre-
hension of advisory activities and their
goals in order to provide process trans-
parency), e.g., how their initial inputs
(needs, preferences, financial situation)
are related to the final advice (e.g., prod-
uct portfolio). The shared artifact there-
fore should visualize the activities so the
client may comprehend intermediate re-
sults as well as the final solution to her
investment problem.
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In traditional pen-and-paper encoun-
ters, advisors may not have complete in-
formation (e.g., fact sheets of all rele-
vant products) or the latest information
at hand (e.g., product performances).
A supportive artifact therefore should
enable access to all relevant informa-
tion with the help of integrated infor-
mation sources (DP3: Support client-
advisor interaction with adequate infor-
mation in order to provide information
transparency). Furthermore, to address
the client’s comprehension of informa-
tion use, visualizations of relevant infor-
mation should be provided as to give
feedback regarding their purpose and
possible effects.
Clients may find it difficult to relate ab-
stract concepts (such as risk and return
of investment strategies) to practical im-
pacts regarding their financial situation.
Thus, the artifact should allow for relat-
ing the relevant concepts to each other
and allow comparing different options
(DP4: Provide means of comparison in
order to enhance comprehension of the
process and its information). For exam-
ple, the client should be enabled to com-
pare the effects of her optimized invest-
ment strategy with her current situation,
including the risk-return tradeoffs. This
principle thereby adds a further dimen-
sion to providing process transparency
(reflecting the implicit solution strategy
of advisory activities, i.e., optimization
by comparison) and information trans-
parency (visualizing effects of provided
or adapted information by comparing
their outcomes).
Finally, the provided shared informa-
tion spaces should not restrict clients
and advisors in performing their favored
structuring and enactment of the en-
counter processes, i.e., not imply stan-
dardized step-by-step processes but allow
for adaptations of the advisory process
flow according to the specific tasks (DP5:
Allow actors to customize the advisory
course).
So far, we have been able to apply and
refine these design principles in three
consecutive design cycles, investigating
designs and effects of process and infor-
mation transparency (Nussbaumer and
Matter 2011; Nussbaumer et al. 2012).
We found advisory encounters provided
with shared, transparent IT support to
be superior compared to their pen-and-
paper counterparts. IT support imple-
menting the specified design principles
thereby relates to significantly improved
process and information transparency as
perceived by the client and significantly
increased trustworthiness and client sat-
isfaction (Nussbaumer et al. 2012).
4 Designing for Cost
Transparency
We have argued above that issues re-
lated to cost transparency may also be a
result of a lack of appropriate IT sup-
port in client encounters. With the typ-
ical product horizon of a FSP, paper-
based access to relevant product-related
cost information as well as the dynamic
calculation of aggregated costs might be
too complex or time-consuming, there-
fore implying support with IT artifacts.
To investigate our conceptualization of
cost transparency, we initiated a de-
sign cycle based on the design princi-
ples presented in the previous section. We
thereby sought to design an IT artifact
that follows the objective of addressing
the two main requirements of cost trans-
parency, i.e., (1) providing transparent
cost information access and (2) compre-
hensibly represent and include such in-
formation in the advisory situation. Re-
lating to the proposed effects of such
transparency in the literature, such an
artifact should positively influence the
client-advisor interaction and improve
the client’s perception thereof.
While previous artifacts (Nussbaumer
and Matter 2011; Nussbaumer et al.
2012) focused on supporting advisory ac-
tivities to define (strategic) investment
strategies, the usage scenario of our cost
transparency design cycle entailed the
collaborative construction of (tactical)
product portfolios according to a pre-
viously defined investment strategy. The
goal thereby was to allow the client
and advisor to browse through available
products, evaluate and compare them
and jointly decide on which products to
add to the client’s portfolio.
Since the comprehensive inclusion of
all financial products potentially avail-
able to a FSP client was not feasible for
the purpose of prototyping, we simpli-
fied the artifact’s usage scenario and cor-
responding design to allow the compo-
sition and adaptation of product port-
folios consisting only of mutual funds.
Due to their rather uniform cost struc-
ture (initial charges, sell charges, stamp
duties and management fees) and pub-
lic availability of cost information, they
also allowed for realistic implementation
and evaluation of the artifact. In the fol-
lowing, we will re-examine the previous
design principles from the perspective of
cost transparency.
To establish informational common
ground and joint interaction, providing
shared information spaces for advisor
and client (DP1) is a prerequisite. While
general transparency (e.g., regarding the
process and activities) does not neces-
sarily imply a technological imperative,
we suggest that the complexity of dy-
namic provision of cost information re-
quires this principle to be implemented
using IT support. As such, cost trans-
parency requires incorporation of DP1
in a technological shape to allow pro-
vision of dynamic cost information as
well as to make them jointly available to
advisor and client. This means that the
client should not only be informed of ac-
tual costs but also be “activated” and en-
abled to act on the provided information,
i.e., to incorporate costs in compiling her
product portfolio.
DP2 requires the transparent arti-
fact to make advisory activities and
their goals comprehensible. Such process
transparency seeks to enable the client to
comprehend the rationales that under-
lie the advisor’s activities, such as choices
in product selection. In respect of cost
transparency, this principle has the ex-
tended goal of enabling the client to also
comprehend the advisor’s rationales re-
garding product costs. Providing means
of advisor monitoring through shared
information spaces is a prerequisite of
clients to comprehend the advisor’s ac-
tions also regarding their implications on
costs.
Thus, to enable the client to transpar-
ently assess the financial impacts of de-
cisions (e.g., buying or selling specific
products), she must be enabled to moni-
tor the specific costs of the emerging so-
lution. DP3 generally seeks to transpar-
ently provide the client with the advi-
sor’s informational basis (e.g., present-
ing internal information of the FSP as
well as client information) and the in-
fluence and effects of this information
on the advisory process and its result. As
such, the principle emphasizes on the im-
plied increase of client comprehension,
e.g., when providing information mate-
rial on the mechanics of asset classes or
interactively showing the influence of the
client’s marital status on her tax burden.
Thus, providing transparent cost infor-
mation may facilitate client learning of
cost structures of products in different
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asset classes. However, interactively pre-
senting product cost effects (e.g., on to-
tal costs or net portfolio return) also ef-
fectively addresses one of the main prob-
lems of advisory services, i.e., the po-
tential opportunism of advisors. Being
provided with shared information spaces,
the client is not only enabled to monitor
the advisor’s action but also to evaluate
them in terms of costs, thereby restrict-
ing the advisor in, e.g., opportunistically
recommending profitable but unsuitable
products. Above, we have defined the
provision of cost information as a spe-
cial facet of information transparency.
Including cost information, however, ex-
tends the goal of DP3 of information
provision for increased client compre-
hension towards client empowerment to
evaluate (and thereby “falsify”) the advi-
sor’s recommendations.
Putting an emphasis on the “falsifica-
tion” of advisor actions and recommen-
dations also affects DP4. In respect to
process transparency and general infor-
mation transparency, means of compari-
son allow the client to better comprehend
the advisor’s actions and their rationale.
For example, comparison of the pro-
jected risk and return performance of the
current investment strategy with the pro-
jected performance of the recommended
optimization provides the client with a
general indication of potential effects. In
contrast, cost transparency should allow
comparison of recommendations’ defi-
nite effects by providing detailed cost
information of individual products and
aggregated costs for created portfolios.
In respect of process adaptability re-
quired by DP5, introducing cost trans-
parency should not interfere with the
course of the advisory encounter. Trans-
parency of costs should be enabled in a
way that allows the client to monitor con-
textual cost information at any time and
independent from advisory activities.
5 Prototypical Implementation
Analogous to previous design cycles (e.g.,
Nussbaumer et al. 2012), we instantiated
the design principles discussed in the pre-
vious section in a software application
for the Microsoft Surface tabletop de-
vice, supporting the interaction scenario
depicted in Fig. 1.
While providing a shared application
constitutes the basis of fulfilling the ar-
tifact’s first objective – providing access
Fig. 1 Collaborative client-advisor interaction, mediated by Microsoft Surface
(http://www.microsoft.com/surface.) tabletop
to cost information –, the particular de-
sign of how to provide such access in
an understandable and comprehensible
way, as demanded by the second ob-
jective, is important. In the following,
we will therefore provide some details
on the design implementation along the
underlying design principles.
We designed the basic interaction of
the artifact to allow collaborative cre-
ation of a product portfolio according
to a specific (previously defined) invest-
ment strategy. To this end, client and ad-
visor are provided with a shared infor-
mation space (DP1) that mediates their
encounter and allows both actors to in-
teract on common ground and monitor
each other’s actions.
The application’s basic information
space (Fig. 2) is divided into the advisor’s
solution space (products; Fig. 2(B)) and
the client’s problem space (product port-
folio with cost information; Fig. 2(C))
as well as a “transition space” for eval-
uating and comparing specific products
(Fig. 2(A)) before adding them to the
client portfolio.
Generally, both the client and the ad-
visor may interact with all application
spaces via touch interaction. As he is both
the domain and the tool expert, however,
it is assumed that the advisor is the appli-
cation’s primary user and leads the client
through the course of portfolio construc-
tion. Still, the shared information space
allows the client to monitor the advisor’s
actions and take corrective action at any
time (DP1, DP2).
The application allows constructing in-
dividual portfolios by adding and remov-
ing products (mutual funds) according
to different asset classes (shares, bonds
and real estate; Fig. 2(B)). When select-
ing an asset class, the associated products
are presented in the “transition space”
as cards that may be freely arranged and
oriented (Fig. 2(A)). The cards are used
to compare products (DP4) based on
several information dimensions (s. be-
low). Once a product is selected, it is
listed in the client’s product portfolio
(Fig. 2(C)) along with the portfolio’s total
costs. Thereby, the costs of all products in
the portfolio are summed up and catego-
rized into one-time and recurring costs.
This allows showing effects of adding and
removing products from the portfolio,
enabling the client to better comprehend
and understand the consequences of such
changes (DP3). As for the client to see rel-
evant portfolio cost information and in-
clude them into her decision making, the
portfolio’s cost information is visible at
any time.
As already indicated above, all available
products of the different asset classes are
displayed as cards (Fig. 2(A)) that feature
several information categories. To satisfy
the general requirement of information
transparency (DP3), each product card
includes a short description and basic in-
formation about the exchange rates and
net performance (Fig. 3(II)) as well as
performance graphs (Fig. 3(I)). This in-
formation should support the client and
advisor in evaluating the products’ ap-
propriateness for the client’s portfolio,
e.g., in regard to risk and return.
Cost information is made available on
a separate card tab (Fig. 3(III)), display-
ing the cost structure of the product with
all relevant partial and aggregated costs
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Fig. 2 Overview of the
prototype application –
(A) product “cards” to
compare different products,
(B) selection of products,
(C) current product
portfolio
(initial buy charges, sell charges, stamp
duties and management fees). Further-
more, the tab allows partial and total
costs of a product to be calculated for a
specific (adaptable) investment amount.
Such calculation of effective product
costs allows quick comparison (DP3) of
products independent from the actual
portfolio, i.e., without adding and re-
moving products and thereby changing
the portfolio. To evaluate their actual in-
fluence on the total portfolio costs, how-
ever, the users may also easily add and re-
move products to and from the portfolio.
Thereby, the client should be enabled to
better assess the cost factors of different
financial products and their differences,
also stimulating her to discuss potential
ambiguities with her advisor or “falsify”
his recommendations.
Our prototype design incorporates rel-
evant cost information as contextual in-
formation that is attached to the advisory
encounter’s main objects of interest, i.e.,
the products and the portfolio. While the
current summary of portfolio costs is vis-
ible at any time, information on prod-
uct costs on the respective cards has to
be actively selected. Thereby, it is in the
actors’ discretion to investigate and dis-
cuss the information or not. As such, the
integrated cost information does not re-
quire additional advisory activities or a
particular order of activities (DP5).
6 Experimental Evaluation
In the previous sections, we have pre-
sented the build activities of our de-
sign cycle. We re-examined general de-
sign principles for client-advisor inter-
action to also account for cost trans-
parency and demonstrated the feasibil-
ity of implementing them in a software
artifact.
Regarding the evaluate activity of de-
sign science endeavors, there is agree-
ment among researchers that design sci-
ence artifacts have to be rigorously eval-
uated by appropriate methods (Hevner
et al. 2004; March and Smith 1995; Witte
1997), such that their utility, quality, and
efficacy can be demonstrated (Hevner
et al. 2004, p. 16). Thereby, the artifact’s
performance should be evaluated against
its design goals and objectives rather than
only its specific (technological) features
(Hevner et al. 2004, p. 78; March and
Smith 1995, p. 254; Peffers et al. 2007,
p. 56).
Several methods have been proposed
such evaluation of design artifacts, in-
cluding observational (case or field) stud-
ies, action research, surveys, analytical
analyses, functional or structural test-
ing, descriptive argumentation and ex-
perimental techniques such as controlled
experiments or simulation (Cleven et al.
2009, p. 4; Hevner et al. 2004, p. 18;
Riege et al. 2009; Siau and Rossi 2011).
To validate design artifacts against con-
jectures about the outcome the designer
sought to improve, experimental tech-
niques like controlled experiments are
useful. They allow measuring the degree
to which the design objectives have been
achieved (Briggs and Schwabe 2011).
In this context, conjectures contrast the
value of some dependent variable (e.g.,
satisfaction) across treatments that in-
stantiate differing values of an indepen-
dent variable. In design science research,
one treatment often relates to using the
designed artifact, whereas other treat-
ments may include previously designed
technological artifacts or control condi-
tions featuring no technological artifact
(Briggs and Schwabe 2011, p. 7).
We designed and implemented our
software artifact along the design objec-
tive of enabling cost transparency in fi-
nancial advisory encounters and accord-
ing to conjectures regarding the positive
effects of such transparency suggested by
the literature. Experimental techniques
provide appropriate means to evaluate
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Fig. 3 Information
provided by product cards –
(I) performance view,
(II) main view: general
information (product
description, ﬁgures on
exchange rate and net
performance) (III) cost
structure
the artifact and the associated conjec-
tures of its efficacy and effects in a con-
trolled environment. The experimental
setting thereby allowed us to simulate ad-
visory encounters comparably well, as we
could build scenarios that mirrored ac-
tual encounters between clients and ad-
visors, including realistic tasks and their
duration. By additionally employing ac-
tual investment advisors, we could eval-
uate the artifact in a quasi-natural but
controllable environment.
To be able to delimit the specific util-
ity and efficacy of our cost-transparent
instantiation from the general features
of process and information transparency,
we built our experiment upon two dif-
ferent settings (treatments). Thereby, one
treatment related to using the arti-
fact that instantiated cost transparency,
whereas the second treatment related to
an analogous software artifact that only
instantiated the general principles of in-
formation and process transparency. Dif-
ferences in client valuation between the
settings could therefore be ascribed to the
differences of the IT artifacts, which were
only related to cost transparency features.
6.1 Conjectures
The presented artifact was developed
along the design objective of improving
cost transparency in client-advisor en-
counters. The most basic conjecture of
our evaluation thereby relates to the ar-
tifact’s fulfillment of this objective. As
the designed artifact makes available all
relevant cost information, it may be
objectively referred to as being cost-
transparent. Along our definition of cost
transparency as the “client’s perceived de-
gree of information revelation regarding
costs and their allocation”, we thereby
assume that the designed artifact will
also improve the clients’ subjective per-
ception of cost transparency, i.e., im-
prove her understanding and perceived
comprehensibility of cost information:
C0: Clients advised with an IT artifact
implementing cost transparency fea-
tures will show improved under-
standing and perceived comprehen-
sibility of product costs than clients
advised with an IT artifact not im-
plementing cost transparency fea-
tures.
Based on the discussion of proposed
transparency effects in the literature
(Sect. 2.2), we may also state some con-
jectures regarding the expected influence
of the cost-transparent artifact design.
Literature suggests that individuals will
prefer transparent alternatives (Anders-
son and Holm 1998; Camerer and Weber
1992). Furthermore, in our exploratory
research we found that clients often as-
cribe their discontent with advisory ser-
vices to a lack of transparency (Mogi-
cato et al. 2009). By implication, we as-
sume that clients will prefer cost trans-
parent advice over its non-transparent
counterpart, and – along Eggert and
Helm’s (2003) observation that (relation-
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Table 1 Client proﬁle
Investment sum CHF 200000
Investment horizon 10 years
Investment goal Achieve returns that are as high as possible
Risk preference Aggressive (on a 5-point scale
“cautious–conservative–moderate–pro-active–aggressive”)
Risk ability Increased (on a 5-point scale “low–limited–normal–increased–high”)
Asset allocation 60 % shares; 25 % bonds; 15 % real estate
ship) transparency might increase client
satisfaction – find both the encounter as
well as the advisor more satisfying. The
according conjectures read as follows:
C1.1: Clients advised with an IT artifact
implementing cost transparency
features will show higher satisfac-
tion regarding the advisory en-
counter than clients advised with
an IT artifact not implementing
cost transparency features.
C1.2: Clients advised with an IT artifact
implementing cost transparency
features will show higher satisfac-
tion regarding the advisor than
clients advised with an IT arti-
fact not implementing these cost
transparency features.
FSPs are not very eager to provide cost
transparent advisory services because of
their implied effects on existing busi-
ness models. Research on price trans-
parency (Carter and Curry 2010), how-
ever, suggests that clients not only pre-
fer transparent settings but may also be
willing to pay premium prices compared
to non-transparent scenarios. We there-
fore assume that clients will show higher
willingness to pay for cost-transparent
advisory settings:
C2: Clients advised with an IT artifact
implementing cost transparency fea-
tures will show higher willingness
to pay for the advisory service than
clients advised with an IT artifact
not implementing cost transparency
features.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Participants
Our evaluation involved 12 clients and 2
advisors from a medium-size Swiss bank.
We determined the sample size by ap-
plying power analysis as suggested in the
literature (Baroudi and Orlikowski 1989;
O’Keefe 2007). We thereby calculated the
sample size of 12 client participants using
G∗Power 3 (Faul et al. 2007) according to
an assumed large effect size of dz = 0.9
(with an assumed mean difference and
standard deviation of 1 and correlation of
0.4), an error probability (α) of .05 and a
test power (1 − β) of .80.
As getting access to FSPs’ affluent
clients proved prohibitively difficult be-
cause of confidentiality issues, we chose
to acquire the client participants by re-
cruiting them from a university forum
(offering 20 CHF as compensation for a
test duration of approximately one hour).
Such convenience sampling, where par-
ticipants partake in studies based on
self-selection, is one of the most com-
mon sampling techniques (Lunsford and
Lunsford 1995; Trochim 2006). As op-
posed to random sampling, using con-
venience sampling does not provide all
members of a target population an equal
chance of being selected. Thus, the par-
ticipants may per se not be assumed to
fully represent the target population. This
may result in low external validity of
a study. For our evaluation purposes –
based on findings and propositions in the
literature (Andersson and Holm 1998;
Eggert and Helm 2003) – we argue that
this preference for transparency is a gen-
eral feature of (ambiguity-averse) indi-
viduals and, thus, recruiting participants
by convenience sampling should not ex-
cessively constrain (external) validity.
The recruited participants (9 of them
being students) were between 21 and 48
years of age, 5 of them being female, 7
being male. All of them reported high
proficiency in computer use (4 partic-
ipants categorized themselves as being
professional users, 8 as advanced users).
Only 5 of them indicated that they were
experienced with mutual funds.
6.2.2 Procedure
The test procedure consisted of two sub-
tests. One test involved the usage of
the prototype application presented in
Sect. 5, providing all relevant cost infor-
mation features (setting T1). The bench-
mark test (setting T0) involved a similar
application, instantiating the basic design
principles discussed in Sect. 3 and imple-
menting the same GUI and interaction
design as the artifact in T1, but not pro-
viding cost information features and as-
sociated functionalities: all cost informa-
tion as shown in Fig. 2(C) and Fig. 3(III)
were removed.
For both treatments, the clients and
advisors received the task of compiling
product portfolios of mutual funds with
the prototype application (s. below). The
client participants passed through both
settings, each being limited to 20 min.
After their trials, the client participants
completed a quantitative questionnaire
and were then asked to give feedback on
their impressions.
To effectively counterbalance poten-
tial biases in respect of the succession
of treatments, we randomized the order
of experimental conditions (Lazar et al.
2010, pp. 50–51). Thus, we randomly
assigned one half of the client partici-
pants to the sequence T0T1 and the other
half to the sequence T1T0. Thereby, they
were also randomly assigned to a spe-
cific combination of advisor and setting
(e.g., each client starting with “advisor
1 − T0” would afterwards be exposed to
“advisor 2 − T1” and vice versa). Differ-
ences in client valuation between the en-
counters could therefore be ascribed, ce-
teris paribus, to the manipulation of the
artifact’s provision of cost information
features.
On arrival, client participants received
a short introduction (10 min), including
instructions about their task and finan-
cial profile as well as explanations about
their time table. To allow for comparison
and prevent participants from disclosing
their actual financial situation, clients re-
ceived key figures of a fictional finan-
cial background (Table 1). They were re-
quested to perform their tasks according
to these figures. Furthermore, they were
advised that the sessions would “differ
regarding the available information”. In
the sessions, the client’s main task was to
create a product portfolio of three mu-
tual funds (one per asset class), match-
ing the given asset allocation and achiev-
ing high returns. For each asset class, the
client could choose between two funds
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that featured similar investment objec-
tives, one being actively managed (and
therefore more costly), and the other be-
ing passively managed. To establish real-
istic conditions, we based all information
of the available products (12 in total) on
existent mutual funds, whereas we altered
their names to avoid experienced clients
recognizing them.
To achieve variation in client prod-
uct choice and minimize learning effects
between the settings, we implemented
the following alterations between the set-
tings: for asset class “shares”, the client
participants had to decide on one of three
categories (Swiss market, global market,
and emerging markets) before each ses-
sion, whereas for each setting they had to
choose a different category. For asset class
“bonds” the actively managed product
and for “real estate” the passively man-
aged product was changed between the
settings.
The two participating financial advi-
sors were briefed regarding the client pro-
files (information listed in Table 1) and
the use of the software artifact. Their
main task was to support (“advise”) the
clients in choosing appropriate products
according to their profile. The advisor’s
goal for each session was to “satisfy”
the client so she would recommend the
encounter to others. Each advisor per-
formed six advisory sessions in setting
T0 as well as six in T1. For the differ-
ent settings, the advisors were given the
following additional tasks:
• T0: avoid discussions about costs, try
to sell actively managed products
• T1: ensure that cost information is
comprehensible for the client (mak-
ing her aware that costs reduce overall
returns)
6.2.3 Apparatus
Both treatments of our evaluation were
conducted using the Microsoft Surface
1.0 tabletop system (s. also Fig. 1).
Thereby, each setting was supported with
a dedicated tabletop system running the
respective prototype application (provid-
ing cost information features/not provid-
ing cost information features).
6.2.4 Design and Analysis
The experimental evaluation followed a
within-subjects design with the proto-
type version (providing cost information
features/not providing cost information
features) as the main experimental factor.
We opted for this experimental design
as it provides a more effective isolation
of individual differences of the partici-
pants from the main effects. Compared
to between-subject designs they are also
considered more powerful, while requir-
ing smaller sample size (Lazar et al. 2010,
pp. 55–51).
The quantitative client questionnaire
included measurements to test our main
conjectures and client preferences (s. be-
low) as well demographic items (age,
gender, job/education, advisory experi-
ence, IT skills). In addition to the quan-
titative questionnaire, we also asked the
client participants to give feedback on
their impressions (differences, prefer-
ences) of the two settings as well as
their experience regarding the sessions’
IT support.
As suggested above, providing cost in-
formation through transparent shared
information spaces already fulfilled the
artifact’s first objective of making cost in-
formation accessible. To investigate the
artifact’s efficacy in fulfilling the sec-
ond objective – providing such access in
an understandable and comprehensible
way (Conjecture 0) –, however, the ar-
tifact’s utility in improving the clients’
cost-related perception had to be con-
sidered. We surveyed the clients’ percep-
tion of cost transparency using three Lik-
ert items. Thereby, the clients were asked
to assess the different settings’ influence
on (1) their subjective understanding of
the product structure (“I understand the
cost structure of the selected products.”),
(2) their awareness of the actual prod-
uct costs (“I am aware of what the se-
lected products cost.”) as well as (3) their
perceived comprehensibility of the pro-
vided cost information (“I found the cost
information comprehensible.”).
To measure satisfaction with each ad-
visory session (Conjecture 1.1), we used
items from the Yield Shift Theory of Sat-
isfaction (Briggs et al. 2008). The client’s
overall satisfaction with the advisors of
the two sessions (Conjecture 1.2) was op-
erationalized with a single item (“Over-
all, I was satisfied with the advisor.”). All
constructs were measured using as seven-
point Likert items (ranging from 1 =
“I strongly disagree” to 7 = “I strongly
agree”). The participants’ willingness to
pay for each performed advisory session
(Conjecture 2) was prompted with the
following item: “How much of your in-
vestment amount of CHF 200000 would
you be willing to pay for the received
advisory service?”.
To investigate client preferences, the
questionnaire also included conjoint
measures. We thereby conducted a rank-
ordering conjoint-analysis on how the
participants would trade-off the follow-
ing aspects: (1) costs of advisory (“advi-
sory session is free of charge” vs. “advi-
sory service costs CHF 250 per hour”);
(2) advisor’s interests (“advisor adheres
to his own interests” vs. “advisor ad-
heres to the client’s interests”); (3) trans-
parency of product costs (“product costs
are not communicated” vs. “product
costs are communicated”). The partic-
ipant’s valuation of these aspects was
tested using a complete factorial plan
(2 × 2 × 2 = 8 different alternatives),
where the participants were requested
to sort the given alternatives according
to their perceived utility (attributing “1”
to the advisory alternative having the
greatest perceived utility and “8” to the
advisory alternative with the smallest
perceived utility).
We analyzed the collected data as fol-
lows. To test our conjectures, we com-
pared the ratings of the two treatments
with dependent t-tests1 (two-tailed) for
normally distributed differences. All but
two differences between the dependent
scores proved to follow normal distribu-
tion (Shapiro-Wilk, p > .081 for all dif-
ferences). For items with non-normally
distributed differences – “willingness
to pay” (Shapiro-Wilk, p < .001) and
“awareness of product costs” (Shapiro-
Wilk, p = .02) – we applied Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks tests.
All p-values of the statistical tests
were corrected for multiple comparisons
using the Benjamini–Hochberg proce-
dure (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995).
The correction also accounted for non-
significant results. To provide an objec-
tive measure of importance, we also cal-
culated effect sizes for all statistical sig-
nificant findings (Cohen’s d for depen-
dent t-tests, r for Wilcoxon tests). To
eliminate the alternative explanation that
higher ratings were related to one advi-
sor generally outperforming the other, we
additionally evaluated the overall satis-
faction of the participants with the two
advisors. Since the ratings for the dif-
ferent advisors were not normally dis-
tributed (Shapiro–Wilk), we conducted
1We thereby implicitly assume that the responses to the Likert items can be treated interval. Non-parametric tests lead to the same results.
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Table 2 Evaluation results (M = mean agreement, SD = standard deviation)
Measure Rating for T0 (not
cost-transparent)
Rating for T1
(cost-transparent)
Test of difference
(two-sided)
Understanding of product
cost structure
M = 2.83, SD = 1.75 M = 6.00, SD = 0.85 t(11) = −5.162,
p = 0.001, d = 2.44
Awareness of selected
product costs
M = 2.58, SD = 1.98 M = 6.50, SD = 0.67 Z = −2.865, p = 0.008,
r = −0.58
Comprehensibility of cost
information
M = 2.42, SD = 1.83 M = 6.00, SD = 0.95 t(11) = −5.555,
p = 0.001, d = 2.58
Satisfaction with advisory
session
M = 4.60, SD = 1.39 M = 5.98, SD = 0.79 t(11) = −3.718,
p = 0.009, d = 1.26
Satisfaction with advisor M = 4.58, SD = 1.62 M = 6.00, SD = 0.74 t(11) = −3.559,
p = 0.007, d = 1.20
Willingness to pay (without
outlier)
M = 366.36,
SD = 415.87
M = 710.91,
SD = 714.71
Z = −2.371, p = 0.020,
r = −0.48
Total portfolio costs M = 6395.25,
SD = 2839.56
M = 3577.58,
SD = 2355.79
t(11) = 2.946, p = 0.017,
d = 1.08
a Wilcoxon test to investigate the dif-
ferences. The rank-ordering conjoint-
analysis was performed using the respec-
tive feature of SPSS 19.
6.3 Results
We present the results of our evalua-
tion along our conjectures regarding the
clients perceived cost transparency, satis-
faction and willingness to pay. We then
provide results of the conjoint analysis
and figures on differences in the total
costs of the portfolios composed in the
different advisory settings. The clients’
average ratings of the settings as well as
the results of the statistical tests regard-
ing their differences are summarized in
Table 2.
6.3.1 Perceived Cost Transparency
In our design considerations we as-
sumed that making available cost in-
formation through the shared artifact
should increase cost transparency. In-
deed, in the evaluation client partici-
pants found that the costs of their se-
lected products were more understand-
able in the cost-transparent setting T1
compared to setting T0 which excluded
all cost information features. Results of
a two-sided dependent t-test showed this
difference to be significant with large ef-
fect size (s. Table 2). Also, the partici-
pants’ agreement of being aware of the
selected products’ costs was significantly
higher for the cost-transparent situation
with large effect size.
Regarding the artifact design’s efficacy
in providing cost transparency in an un-
derstandable manner, we also measured
the client’s perception of the provided in-
formation’s comprehensibility. Support-
ing our conjecture, results show that
client participants found cost informa-
tion provision very comprehensible for
the cost-transparent situation, showing
a significant difference compared to the
non-transparent setting with large effect
size.
To gain qualitative argumentation from
the participants, we also asked them for
feedback on their experience. Observing
the sessions, we found that only three of
six participants passing the sessions in the
sequence T1T0 asked about costs in T0
(featuring no cost information). In their
feedback, however, those who had asked
for cost information voiced their dissatis-
faction with the advisors’ answers. They
criticized that the advisor just “read out
some numbers from a sheet of paper”,
which was insufficient for them to make
a decision. Two of the three participants,
who did not ask about the costs in T0,
said that they – after having already expe-
rienced T1 – felt confident of being able
to estimate the costs themselves. Interest-
ingly, most of the participants passing the
sessions in the sequence T0T1 mentioned
that they had not realized that the advi-
sor of T0 had kept back cost information
until they passed T1.
6.3.2 Satisfaction
Both the clients’ satisfaction with the ad-
visory session as well as with the advi-
sor were rated significantly lower for T0
(non-transparent regarding costs) than
for T1 (cost-transparent) with large effect
sizes. Hence, according to our data we
may maintain conjecture C1.1 and C1.2.
To eliminate the alternative explanation
that higher satisfaction ratings might be
related to one advisor generally outper-
forming the other, we sorted the partici-
pant’s satisfaction ratings by advisor (ad-
visor 1: M = 5.75, SD = 1.14; advisor 2:
M = 4.83, SD = 1.59). A Wilcoxon test
did not show any significant differences
between the advisor ratings, i.e., one ad-
visor did not significantly outperform the
other.
In their feedbacks, all twelve partici-
pants indicated that they would clearly
recommend the advisory session featur-
ing all relevant cost information (T1).
The specific explanations of their rec-
ommendation, however, were different.
Four participants preferred T1 because
they felt “better informed”. Two felt that
T1 was “more transparent” than T0.
One participant mentioned that, while
in T0 the advisor “was beating around
the bush”, session T1 better enabled advi-
sor and client to “talk about facts”. Four
clients based their recommendation on
the perception that the advisor in T1 was
more competent.
6.3.3 Willingness to Pay
While the average willingness to pay for
T0 was CHF 503, the participants were
willing to pay CHF 1485 for T1. The
large standard deviation of T1 (T0: SD =
616.13; T1: SD = 2766.76) is salient,
but can be explained by the large varia-
tions (the differences between T0 and T1
ranged from CHF 0 to CHF 8000). If we
exclude one outlier (difference between
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the two answers: CHF 8000), the differ-
ences between T0 and T1 are significant
with a large effect size (s. Table 2). We
therefore also may maintain conjecture
C2.
6.3.4 Conjoint Analysis
The rank-ordering conjoint analysis (s.
Fig. 4) shows that the participants value
the advisor’s interest the most (49 %).
Valued with 27.6 %, also cost trans-
parency seems to be more important for
the participants than the advisory service
being free-of-charge (23.4 %).
Though the sample size of the rank-
ordering conjoint-analysis is too small to
allow for general assumptions about the
value systems of FSP clients, it provides
interesting insights about how the partic-
ipants trade off the different aspects.
For each advisory session the assem-
bled portfolio was saved. Analyzing these
portfolios, we find that for T0 63.9 %
of the chosen products were actively
managed (and therefore more costly),
whereas for T1 only 27.8 % of the chosen
products were actively managed (differ-
ence between T0 and T1: −36.1 %). Only
considering portfolios of clients inexperi-
enced with mutual funds, the amount of
actively managed products decreases by
−52 %. For experienced clients, however,
we only find a difference of −13 %. Ac-
cordingly, the calculated portfolio costs
per year (including issuing commission
and redemption commission) are signif-
icantly higher for T0 with a large effect
size (s. Table 2).
The participants’ feedback on the IT
support was mainly positive, with only
two participants stating that they dis-
liked the tool. One of them regarded him-
self as “old-fashioned” and would have
preferred a paper-based advisory service.
The other criticized the low resolution of
the tabletop device and thus also would
have preferred a paper-based or PC-
based advisory encounter. The remain-
ing ten participants, however, showed a
very positive attitude toward the pro-
vided IT support. One participant de-
scribed the advisory encounter as being
very goal-oriented, thereby greatly sim-
plifying the investment decision, whereas
another one emphasized the provided
transparency and comprehensibility. This
enables the client to observe the advi-
sor’s actions at any time. Lastly, one par-
ticipant expressed his attitude as follows:
“Why such tools are not already used in
the daily business?”
Fig. 4 Importance of advisory aspects as valued by the participants
7 Discussion
In this paper, we have argued that issues
of process, information and cost trans-
parency may be adequately addressed
with collaborative and transparent IT
artifacts. Instantiating design principles
that have been developed and refined in
previous design cycles, we presented how
cost transparency may be supported by
example of a prototypical tabletop appli-
cation. We then investigated the efficacy
and utility of our cost-transparent design
in an experimental evaluation.
Looking at the results, we can see
that the cost transparency features of
our artifact design indeed improved
the clients’ understanding and per-
ceived comprehension of costs. Also,
we found that cost transparency also in-
fluences client-advisor interaction and
the client’s perception thereof. Support-
ing the client-advisor encounter with a
cost-transparent artifact thereby relates
to significantly increased client satisfac-
tion with the situation and the advisor as
well as increased willingness to pay. Thus,
we may maintain all conjectures posed in
Sect. 6.1.
7.1 Cost Transparency
We defined the two main objectives of
our designed artifact to (1) provide ac-
cess to cost information and (2) to com-
prehensibly represent and include the in-
formation into the advisory situation.
Based on several generic design princi-
ples, we have presented an artifact design
that fulfills the first objective by provid-
ing shared information spaces, allowing
clients to access cost information in the
advisory encounter. Regarding the sec-
ond objective, in our evaluation we could
also show that the design also succeeded
in providing cost information in a com-
prehensible way. While the large differ-
ences between the settings might seem
quite obvious – after all, for the non-
transparent setting clients rated their un-
derstanding and comprehensibility based
on being provided no cost information
at all –, also the absolute ratings of the
cost-transparent setting’s comprehensi-
bility were very high (with mean ratings
of 6.00).
7.2 Client Satisfaction
We have argued that in investment ad-
visory services cost transparency issues
may inhibit advisory quality and may
lead to client dissatisfaction (Mogicato
et al. 2009; Oehler and Kohlert 2009).
Research suggests that clients might
not only prefer transparent situations
(Camerer and Weber 1992; Carter and
Curry 2010), since they are less “am-
biguous” and therefore easier to “falsify”,
but also perceive them as more satisfy-
ing (Eggert and Helm 2003). The results
of our evaluation support such notions,
showing that the presence of an artifact
providing cost information may increase
client satisfaction. Indeed, we find signif-
icant differences with large effect sizes in
the client’s ratings of both the advisory
session as well as the according advisor.
In this regard, it is important to note that
the clients’ satisfaction with the advisor
increased with the cost-transparent set-
ting, i.e., their satisfaction was not based
on specific characteristics of the advisor
but the presence of cost information.
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7.3 Willingness to Pay
Our results clearly support the conjec-
ture that transparency might increase
the client’s willingness to pay for advice.
The evaluation shows that the client’s
willingness to pay significantly increased
in the advisory settings using our cost-
transparent artifact. Looking at the large
effects regarding the decrease of effec-
tive portfolio costs in the transparent set-
ting, the willingness to pay is justified
from an economic perspective. However,
the client’s “social perspective” on pricing
(Carter and Curry 2010) might also in-
fluence such behavior. From this perspec-
tive, the rather high willingness to pay
may result from the client rewarding the
advisor’s transparent and “fair” advice.
The client’s willingness to pay may
be one fundamental premise for FSPs
to abandon today’s practice of cross-
subsidizing advisory services with prod-
uct and transaction costs. The partici-
pants of our evaluation were indeed will-
ing to pay for the received advisory ser-
vices, even for the setting that did not fea-
ture cost transparency. We cannot, how-
ever, estimate possible effects of the IT
artifacts on the client’s perception. With
10 of 12 participants positively evaluating
the artifacts, we cannot rule out positive
effects on their willingness to pay for both
settings.
From an economic perspective, the
amount our participants were willing to
pay clearly failed to draw level with the
FSP’s potential gains from portfolio costs.
However, as our conjoint analysis exem-
plarily shows, the clients may also be will-
ing to pay for advice on a recurring ba-
sis (e.g., per hour). Indeed, compared
to the advisor’s interests and cost trans-
parency of the encounter, our evalua-
tion participants valued advisory costs
as rather unimportant. These preferences
were compatible with their reported will-
ingness to pay: clients were willing to pay
much higher fees for the encounter that
was cost-transparent and thus less asym-
metric. Contrary to the FSPs beliefs, this
may indicate that the client’s willingness
to pay is not the main obstacle of al-
ternative business models. Furthermore,
given that active clients typically seek ad-
vice several times a year, fee-based but
transparent advisory models could in-
deed be economically viable (presuming
that in such scenarios cross-subsidization
will decrease). However, from our ob-
servations we cannot estimate the actual
share of clients willing to pay for ad-
vice. Further research will have to inves-
tigate whether and in how far the popu-
lation of advisory clients conforms to our
observed preference system.
We conclude the discussion with some
remarks on further potential limitations.
While the design principles have been de-
veloped and refined in several design it-
erations, they are general in nature and
provide only few implications on their
actual implementation in an IT arti-
fact. For example, our artifact’s “card”
metaphor to allow for comparison of
multiple products is only one of many
possibilities to provide such functional-
ity. It is therefore important to acknowl-
edge that each instantiation of an artifact
supporting collaborative, (cost) transpar-
ent client-advisor interaction may greatly
differ in appearance and usability. Fur-
thermore, from our experimental eval-
uation, we may not conclude that our
implementation was “optimal” or supe-
rior to other potential design instantia-
tions. This also applies to the cost infor-
mation we decided to implement and vi-
sualize. While we were eager to design
the information architecture along stan-
dard FSPs brochures available to clients,
the selection of relevant cost information
was subject to our restriction on mutual
funds.
Other limitations are related to our
evaluation design. We carefully designed
our experimental evaluations regarding
the test design and its estimated effects
based on power analysis and controlled
for the influence of advisor/setting com-
binations by balancing client assignment
to the different treatments. We acknowl-
edge, however, that the majority of client
participants were students rather than
“real” investors. We argue, however, that
preference for transparency is a general
feature of ambiguity-averse individuals
(Andersson and Holm 1998), such that
our results may also be applicable to the
“population” of investors. Also, we did
not find differences between the ratings
of experienced clients and their inexpe-
rienced counterparts. To be sure, the test
setting and the sample size are not quali-
fied to reliably control for such effects; we
suggest that further research should in-
vestigate possible variances according to
such client characteristics.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed sev-
eral transparency issues that occur in
investment advisory service encounters,
putting an emphasis on cost trans-
parency. Building upon tried design
principles, we implemented a proto-
typical IT artifact, exemplarily enabling
cost-transparent composition of product
portfolios. We evaluated the application’s
utility and efficacy in experimental evalu-
ations and according to four conjectures.
Results show that the artifact’s transpar-
ent provision of cost information indeed
increases the client’s perception under-
standing and comprehension of costs,
positively influences the client’s satisfac-
tion with the advisory encounter (and the
advisor) as well as relates to significantly
increased willingness to pay for the ser-
vice received. Analogous to similar eval-
uations (Nussbaumer et al. 2012), feed-
back on the IT artifact was very posi-
tive, suggesting that IT-supported advi-
sory encounters may be accepted by ad-
visors and clients alike. Clients showed
significantly increased satisfaction with
the advisor in the cost-transparent set-
ting, some of them even perceiving him
as more competent. Thus, contrary to
the popular argumentation of advisors
that using IT in client encounters would
negatively influence the client-advisor
interaction (Schwabe and Nussbaumer
2009), IT might even improve the client’s
perception of the advisor.
We have motivated this paper from ob-
servations of Swiss investment advisory
services. However, the design research
question of cost transparency and its util-
ity are not limited to the Swiss market.
We argue that information and interest
asymmetries are general features of in-
vestment advisory services – e.g., even
fee-based advisory concepts (which are
more prevalent outside of Switzerland)
may be strained by principal-agent con-
flicts regarding cost information. Thus,
we find that our findings may indeed
have general implications for (invest-
ment) advisory services also outside of
Switzerland.
From our findings, we suggest sev-
eral such implications for FSP practice
of investment advisory service provi-
sion. Generally, we argue that for FSPs
(cost) transparency should not only take
a role in obeying regulations. In fact,
they should actively seek realization of
transparency as a means of competitive
differentiation. In this paper, we have
shown how this may be accomplished
with IT. Not only are clients increasingly
demanding IT support in service encoun-
ters (Schwabe and Nussbaumer 2009) but
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Abstract
Philipp Nussbaumer, Inu Matter,
Gian Reto à Porta, Gerhard Schwabe
Designing for Cost
Transparency in Investment
Advisory Service Encounters
Investment advisory services of ﬁnan-
cial service providers (FSPs) exhibit sev-
eral characteristics that are detrimen-
tal to advisory quality. The interaction
of advisor and client is strained by a
lack of transparency regarding the ad-
visory process (what activities are per-
formed and why) and the information
used therein (what information is used
for what purpose and with what ef-
fect), as well as regarding the precise
costs of the service and the recom-
mended products. In prior research, we
suggested that process and informa-
tion transparency issues may be appro-
priately addressed with collaborative
information technology (IT) artifacts.
In this paper, we argue that collabo-
rative, transparent artifacts may also
be a premise of enabling cost trans-
parency. To this end, we describe a
complete research cycle of designing,
implementing, and evaluating a shared
cost-transparent IT artifact to support
client-advisor interaction in investment
advisory encounters. Evaluation results
suggest the efﬁcacy of our design in
improving the clients’ perceived cost
transparency as well as increase their
satisfaction and their willingness to
pay for the received investment advice.
These ﬁndings may also challenge the
common belief of FSPs that transpar-
ent, fee-based advisory services would
neither be accepted by clients nor be
economically viable. Practical implica-
tions of these ﬁndings for designing
advisory encounters with supportive IT
are discussed.
Keywords: Cost transparency, Finan-
cial investment advisory, Design sci-
ence, Exploratory evaluation
also may IT be key in addressing trans-
parency issues which affect client-advisor
interaction and, thereby, advisory quality.
We find that establishing IT-supported
transparency may be of value for almost
all existing business models of FSPs. For
clients seeking “execution only” services,
IT may be used to show potential effects
of client decisions and ensure their suit-
ability. Even though for “execution only”
Swiss FSPs are not obliged to perform
suitability checks, IT support would al-
low for such feedback in an efficient way,
thereby potentially increasing client satis-
faction and retention. We find the great-
est potential, however, in the support of
“investment advice” encounters. Here IT
may provide a common ground of client-
advisor interaction and point of refer-
ence for their joint decisions. Thereby,
IT may not only enable transparency and
traceability as requested by regulations
but also provide support for the advi-
sor to better advise the client and in-
crease comprehension of her investment
decisions.
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